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Political parties are generally regarded as an indispensable element of modern democracy and as a primary mechanism of linkage between citizens and the state. From Schattschneider’s well known claim that ‘modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties’, to Sartori’s assertion that ‘citizens in Western democracies are represented through and by parties. This is inevitable’ – political scientists and the public alike have acknowledged the paramount importance of these institutions. Yet, the exact nature of party government and its democratic legitimacy remains surprisingly under-theorised. Our expectations of how political parties should operate and what outcomes (in terms of participation and representation) they should deliver remain rooted in the mass-party paradigm, which characterised electoral politics from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century.
This paper explores the evolution of the concept of ‘party government’, and how it has derived from actual political practice. Looking particularly at the internal organisation of political parties and how they provide (or purport to provide) a forum for political participation and representation, I trace the adaptation of political parties away from their traditional role as aggregators of distinct social interests to their emerging role as efficient vehicles of governance. The everyday workings of political parties, I argue, is an area in which there is a distinct disjoint between the theory and practice of democracy, as meaningful participation within parties is limited and the role of party parliamentarians as representatives of both the party and the electorate is problematic and fraught with tensions. There is a need, therefore, to reconsider the theoretical concepts of party government and party representation, and to re-evaluate what we expect from parties and their role in modern democracies, particularly in light of parties’ changing organisational structures and growing public disaffection with these institutions.
Despite the sheer volume of literature on representation, the place of political parties in modern representative democracies remains distinctly under-theorised. Party government and party representation (especially the relationships between governments and the parties that support them) have been given very little direct, or conscious, academic attention. As Blondel and Cotta (1996: 1) note, ‘why this should be the case is somewhat mysterious and surely surprising; but at the root of this state of affairs lies probably the fact that the question is viewed as straightforward and at any rate as simple’. Indeed, it is generally taken for granted that governments comprise of parties, and that these organisations play a prominent, if not indispensable role in today’s democracies. From Schattschneider’s (1942: 1) well known claim that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties’, to Sartori’s (1968: 471) assertion that ‘citizens in Western democracies are represented through and by parties. This is inevitable’ – political scientists have acknowledged the paramount importance of these institutions. This sentiment is also reiterated in public opinion – for example, a recent analysis of survey data from 13 democracies revealed that three-quarters of respondents thought that political parties were necessary for democracy (Dalton and Weldon 2005: 933).
Nonetheless, as Gunther and Diamond (2001: 3) argue, ‘political parties are not what they used to be’. Indeed, society’s acceptance of political parties as actors in the political process seems to be deteriorating to that of a ‘necessary evil’ (Bale and Roberts 2002). Despite public acknowledgement of parties as indispensable political entities, few believe that parties actually care what people think (Dalton and Weldon 2005: 933). Consistent empirical evidence across advanced industrial democracies suggests that party membership is in steady decline (Mair and van Biezen 2001; Scarrow 2000), electoral turnout and campaign participation is dropping (Franklin 2004; Wattenberg 2003), and that partisan attachments have significantly weakened (Dalton 2000). These trends have prompted suggestions from scholars such as Mair (2005) that parties have failed to adequately provide a mechanism by which citizens can participate in politics and may herald the gradual decline of populist government.
The contradictory attitude towards parties as a ‘necessary evil’ suggests is that there is a significant gap between the theory and practice of political parties in modern representative democracies. At a basic level, disaffection with parties could simply be explained by the fact that they are failing to meet our expectations. Indeed, this is the common conclusion reached by many commentators calling for ‘democratic renewal’ and the re-engagement of parties and the public (see for example, the Power Inquiry, http://www.makeitanissue.org.uk). But what are these expectations based on, and how were they formulated? Are they still relevant today? Should we revise them to accommodate political practice, or should we strive to make political practice meet our expectations? Answering these questions is essential to evaluating the performance of parties in modern societies, yet they are often ignored or taken for granted.
The aim of this paper is to deconstruct the underlying assumptions behind party government, particularly parties’ normative place in modern democracies. The first part of the paper presents a brief overview of the concept of party government in historical perspective. I argue that party government (or party representation) is a relatively new chapter of democratic theory and has developed largely in response to the emergence of parties in the 19th century as a description of actual political practice. Drawing together many of the disparate writings on party government, the paper outlines a number of common themes and draws out a distinct normative view shared by most theorists as to the proper role of parties in modern democracies: one of ‘representation’ and ‘linkage’. The second part of the paper explores the relationship between the theory and practice of party government, which has ultimately led to a ‘crisis of representation’ in the party literature. This has occurred because normative conceptions of the functions parties ought to perform in representative democracies have not changed in over a century, yet the organisation and working manner of parties has altered significantly. I briefly trace the development of parties from ‘mass’ organisations, prioritising the representation of distinct partisan interests; to ‘cartel’ parties – organisations capturing the median vote and intent on maintaining their place in government (or Parliament) thereby protecting the institutional status and resources it offers, and the implications this has for party theory. What we are left with is a decidedly pessimistic literature that catalogues the failings of parties, rather than one that re-evaluates what society should expect from its parties. Finally, I examine parties’ own response to this debate, in particular how the parties’ rhetoric reflects on their role in democratic societies.
There is little academic discourse on party government and only a few attempts have been made to define the relationships that are subsumed within it. In the broader context of democratic theory, party government is a relatively new concept owing to the fact that parties themselves are a relatively recent organisational development. Parties within western democracies did not emerge until the late 1800s (Barendt 1998: 150; Loveday, Martin & Parker 1977: 6-15) and mass parties with distinct extra-parliamentary organisations are a phenomenon that developed only in the twentieth century. Before this time, constituents were represented by individual parliamentarians in the model of an elector-trustee relationship constructed by territorial boundaries. To the extent that they existed, organisational groupings within the legislature were formed to serve the interests of individual parliamentarians, but these ‘factions’ were transient, prone to destabilisation through lack of any party discipline and based on pragmatism rather than on principle or ideology.
Indeed, the prevailing social attitudes towards political parties for most of the 17th and 18th centuries were negative. As van Biezen (2003: 174) notes, ‘the existence of political parties was essentially incompatible with the liberal democratic tradition rooted in the political philosophy of Locke and the radical democratic tradition inspired by Rousseau, both of which are difficult to marry with partisan institutions’. For example, in each Australian colony prior to federation, the ‘ruling ideal of independence’ was taken to mean that men should not attach themselves regularly to parties, leaders or causes but should instead exercise independent judgement on all matters that came before Parliament (Loveday et. al. 1977: 42). Similarly, Epperson (1986) documents the animosity towards political parties held by America’s founding fathers and leading politicians at the time of Confederation. Although political parties were present in American politics prior to the ratification of the US Constitution and the first government quickly divided into partisan groups that formed the basis of the nation’s first party system (Epperson 1986: 3), political discussion during the 18th century was pervaded by a kind of anti-party cant (Hofstader 1969). Parties were criticised as unnecessarily divisive, the cause of needless social conflict – appealing and acting as the instruments of narrow and special interests. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison contemplated the role of parties in the Federalist Papers in the 1780s, both regarding them as a pestilence contaminating the body politic (Epperson 1986: 3). As Scarrow (2006: 17) argues, throughout the 18th and 19th centuries ‘most of those involved in what we would now describe as political parties themselves rejected the label: in fact many claimed the moral high ground or pursuing the best path for the nation, while deriding their opponents for being “partisan”’. The consequence of this thinking has meant that parties have historically been regarded as private organisations, with little relevance to (or have been deliberately excluded from) the practice of government. Reflecting this mindset, it has only been recently that parties have been recognised and included in the constitutional framework of government in Australia (1977), New Zealand (1986) and the United Kingdom (1998).[i]
Notwithstanding the status of political theory, actual political practice changed rapidly in the 19th and 20th centuries when a rapidly expanding franchise and the onset of mass electoral politics led to the inevitable formation of parties as organisations to contest elections. Liberal party groupings emerged in the United Kingdom from the middle of the 19th century, whilst the Labour Party followed in 1900 and the Conservatives in 1912. Gradually politics began to be defined in terms of partisan struggles and writings on political parties shifted from whether they were desirable at all, to a more descriptive discussion of party types and features (Scarrow 2006: 17).
Given this general climate of animosity, the theory behind party government and representation, and more broadly the place of parties in representative democracies, has developed largely in reaction to rather than in contemplation of the emergence of parties as widespread organisational entities. As Judge (1999: 71) observes, party theory is ‘best understood as a rationale of practice rather than a theory as such’. No single theorist can be credited for its development; previous surveys of the literature simply make reference to parties’ practices as embodied in ‘Socialist and Tory democracy’ (Beer 1969: 70), traditional doctrines held to ‘reflect the history of the party system’ (Oliver 1991: 116-7) and ‘left-wing writers’ (Birch 1971: 980; see Judge 1999: 71).
Consequently, attempts to theorise the place of parties in representative government tend to be quite descriptive. It is difficult to speak of a coherent body of literature on ‘party theory’ – normative assumptions as to the role of parties need to be drawn from the more extensive literature on party development and organisation, which has been largely based on empirical observations (see for example, Michels 1962; McKenzie 1963; Ostrogorski 1964). Party theory is also characterised as quite disparate, with numerous conceptions of similar overarching themes. Some authors speak of ‘party government’ (Blondel and Cotta 1996; Katz 1986), others of ‘party representation’ (Judge 1999), whilst a broader view is encapsulated in ‘the place of parties in contemporary democracies’ (van Biezen 2003; Allern and Pedersen 2007). However, I use this terms interchangeably as they all share a common theme: the centrality of parties as the units of political decision-making.
In very broad terms, party government can be conceptualised as ‘that form of societal conflict regulation in which a plurality of democratically organised political parties play a relatively dominant role both in the socio-political mediation sphere and in the actual process of political decision-making’ (Mintzel & Schmitt 1981). More specifically, Katz suggests three conditions necessary for party government to exist (1986: 43). First, ‘all major governmental decisions must be taken by people chosen in elections conducted along party lines, or by individuals appointed by and responsible to such people’. Second, policy must be decided by the governing party (in a majoritarian system), or by negotiation amongst parties in a coalition. Finally, the ‘highest officials’ (for example, the prime minister and cabinet) must ‘be selected by their parties and held responsible to the people through their parties’. The common element in both these conceptions of party government is the prominence of parties as entrenched organisational entities in their respective political systems. However, in requiring accountability in decision-making through elections conducted along party lines, Katz’s definition also implies that parties act as mechanisms of transmission of policy preferences from the people to the Parliament.
The idea that parties should transfer the views of the citizens to the state is perhaps the key assumption made in the party literature, and forms the basis of both empirical studies of parties (Luther & Müller-Rommel 2002: 5) and our expectations of how parties should operate. Although this concept of ‘linkage’ has been used by political scientists in various ways, it can be most broadly conceived in Key’s (1967: 411) terms as ‘the interplay…between mass opinion and government’ or as Wright (1971: 26) suggests, playing the role ‘as intermediaries linking citizens with government’. Linkage is not a function vested exclusively in parties, and organisations such as environmental groups and community associations also actively assume this role. However, unlike such associations that must rely on ‘external’ political strategies such as protest and lobbying parliamentarians, a political party is the only organisation that can create an entire linkage chain: from constituents and party members to candidates, elected representatives and to government officials.
Linkage involves both the participation of citizens in politics and their representation by political elites, but rather than treat these two concepts as distinct processes, Lawson (1988: 14) argues that ‘it would make better sense, of course, to treat both participation and representation as subsumed under “linkage” – links have two ends – and then to explore the nature of the connection between the two’. This conception of linkage varies significantly from that employed by Eulau and Prewitt (1973) in their study of the relationship between local councillors and their constituents, in which linkage refers only to acts of citizen participation in that relationship. Theoretically, participation occurs in isolation, and is more or less divorced from the elite response to this participation, which is provided by ‘representation’ (see Lawson 1988: 14). It also differs from the competitive model of democracy posited by scholars such as Arrow (1951), Downs (1957) and Schumpeter (1942), in which citizen participation (apart from voting in elections) serves little purpose. Parties are regarded as self-interested actors and through the mechanism of party competition are assumed to respond to changes in electoral opinion to secure votes, thereby providing democratic representation. However, in this paper I adopt Lawson’s conception of linkage, not only because it is this model that is advocated by the parties themselves (see below), but also given the current climate of disillusionment with parties and democracy more generally, it is crucial to explore the interplay between participation and representation in the linkage chain. If citizen participation and elite representation are disconnected within the practices of parties, the link between citizens and the state is significantly weakened, if not broken.
How can these theoretical concepts be translated to actual political practice? The concept of linkage can been applied to the process of policy development and application within political parties to create a ‘chain’ of representation. In what Judge (1999: 71) refers to as an ‘idealised view of responsible government’, membership participation should be translated into policy outcomes in the following sequence: first, a party formulates a manifesto and/or policies to present to voters at a general election with the maximum possible citizen/membership participation; second, voters choose between parties on the basis of their manifestoes and policies; and third, parties seek to translate their policies and platforms into policy outcomes once they have gained parliamentary representation.
This conception of representation remained influential throughout the twentieth century and continues to do so, although it originated from the mass-party phase that characterised electoral politics from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Under this model a mass party had three basic functions deriving from the need to integrate the newly enfranchised working class into the political system (Miller 2005: 69). Mass parties sought to recruit members and expand resources, develop policies to be implemented by elected officials and contest election campaigns (Ware 1996: 111). Through a system of grassroots participation that filtered up from local branches to party conferences, parties played a fundamental role in ‘the translation of mass preferences into public policy’ (Key 1961: 432). Political conflict occurs between distinct social groups, each represented by a party with a clear and coherent ideological programme. Elected politicians are bound to adhere to the party’s policies and programme. In contrast to the freedom granted to (and expected from) parliamentarians under a Burkean (trustee) model of representation, party discipline is regarded not only as legitimate, but essential (Judge 1999: 71; Birch 1971: 97). As Katz and Mair (1995: 7) note, the legitimacy of party discipline
Depends, in turn, on direct popular involvement in the formulation of the party programme and, from an organizational perspective, this implies the need for an extensive membership organization of branches or cells in order to provide for mass input into the party’s policy making process, as well as for the supremacy of the extra-parliamentary party, particularly as embodied in the party congress.
Thus political practice was of paramount importance in the development of this theory, particularly the emergence of labour parties around the world, which based their organisation on a very close relationship between members, electors and representatives through trade unions, shared class backgrounds and a common ideology – to protect and advance the interests of ‘workers’ (Judge 1999: 75-6).
How closely does this view of party government actually reflect political practice? Although the function that parties play in providing a forum for political participation is heavily emphasised by both participatory and deliberative democratic theorists (for example, see Pateman 1970; Teorell 1999), it is criticised as being under-performed within competitive electoral systems – that is, those systems that prioritise the aggregation of citizens’ interests at the ballot box (Webb 2002: 449). In part this can be explained by the ever-increasing gap between the theory and practice of party government. Whilst society’s normative expectations of how parties should operate in liberal democracies remain rooted in the mass party paradigm, the nature of politics, the conduct of campaigns and the importance ascribed to electoral success has fundamentally altered the way in which parties operate as political organisations.
This change is catalogued in empirical studies of the working-mode of parties, which trace the evolution of parties from partisan groupings (mass parties) to what has been termed ‘catch-all’ and ‘electoral professional’ parties, to ‘cartel’ organisations. If we follow the development of the modern political party over the last century, it is evident that parties simply do not require members as a labour resource to the same extent to which they did in Duverger’s (1963) archetypal mass party phase, which characterised party organisation in the mid twentieth-century. Technological developments, such as the electronic media, have restructured political campaigns as direct appeals from political leaders to citizens, privileging the personalities of party leaders over the presentation of ideology and policy, and reducing the utility of the mass membership as a vehicle for electoral mobilisation (Gunther & Diamond 2003: 168). Political campaigning is now undertaken by teams of professionals (Panebianco 1988), their activities increasingly directed by the party in public office and resourced by the state and public funds (Katz and Mair 1995; van Biezen 2003). On the supply side, declining partisan attachments, shifts in lifestyle and alternative opportunities for political participation are cited as explanations for the declining willingness of citizens to participate in party politics (see Scarrow 2000: 83).
The lessening of class cleavages in the post-war period, a growing middle class and changes in campaign technology are generally attributed to have encouraged the development of ‘catch-all’ and ‘electoral professional’ parties. The political practice of these parties differed significantly from the mass parties that preceded them; rather than representing a segment of society or a set of interests (for example, the working class), these parties turned their efforts to capturing the support of the ‘median voter’, producing policies to appeal to the electorate at large, often at the expense of ideological purity. This approach was facilitated by unprecedented improvements in campaigning technology that emerged with the mass media. Rather than working through traditional channels and using party members as a labour resource for door-knocking and conducting public meetings, party leaders were able to reach an unprecedented percentage of the population through television, radio and printed publications.
This shift in practice has, in turn, affected the theoretical role of parties in modern democracies. As electoral pragmatism replaced an ideologically driven agenda, the function of representation has shifted from aggregating (and responding to) the views of a party’s members and its supporters to formulating policies perceived to be popular with the entire electorate. This, in Kirchheimer’s (1966:199) words, created a party characterised as ‘non-utopian, non-oppressive and ever so flexible’. The role of parties as centres of participation was also downgraded, as members’ roles in policy-making, fund-raising and campaigning were reduced and replaced by paid professionals. As Katz and Mair (1997: 101) argue, the locus of power within the party organisation was shifting from the membership and the extra-parliamentary organisation, which emphasised participation and ideology, to the ‘more electorally ambitious and pragmatic parliamentary elite’ (see Miller 2005: 71).
More recently, the introduction of public funding for parties’ election expenses has prompted theorists to re-evaluate the relationship between parties and the state. The ‘cartel party’ represents the latest model in the evolution of party types; one in which governing parties (or those established in the Parliament) are able to utilise the resources of public office to the exclusion of new parties and other competitors (Katz and Mair 1995; Blyth and Katz 2005). This includes obtaining and manipulating direct state funding to parties, parliamentary expenses to subsidise party activity and the allocation of publicly funded broadcasting time. Like a catch-all party, the locus of power in a cartel party resides in the parliamentary party (especially the leadership) who receive and control the distribution of state resources, and the influence of the extra-parliamentary wing of the party organisation is minimised.
A cartel party can prima facie appear to be internally democratic – individual members are offered greater participatory opportunities to influence policy and select candidates, typically through direct ballots. However, internal democracy is largely illusory, as the focus on largely inactive and moderate individual members privileges the parliamentary party by circumventing party activists and other centres of power within the party such as national conferences, regional and local branches (Blyth and Katz 2005). The decision-making power and influence within the party becomes ever more centralised in the party in public office and the leadership. As Katz (2001: 293) aptly describes, it is a strategy of ‘empowering while decapitating the membership’. In terms of representation, we see a distinct policy convergence between the parties as established parties continue to pursue policy positions that are electorally agreeable, reducing the options available to voters and the diversity across the policy spectrum.
Furthermore, within the cartel party model, policy is increasingly influenced by the ‘perspectives and priorities of the state bureaucracy’ (Miller 2005: 73), shifting the impetus for policy formulation away from parties to the executive. Policy commitments are increasingly becoming ‘externalised’ and delegated to experts, particularly in the area of economic policy. For example, in 1997 New Labour granted the Bank of England the effective power to set interest rates, subject only to the advice of a government appointed Monetary Policy Committee. This delegation of responsibility and power was not mentioned in the party’s election manifesto, and would have been deemed unthinkable by previous governments, regardless of party type (Blyth and Katz 2005: 47).
The organisational changes that parties have undergone in the last century presents a number of challenges for the operation of party government as it has traditionally been conceived. First, as the above example with respect to interest rates illustrates, the criteria that policy must be decided by the governing party is compromised when what were once regarded as major party political policy decisions are being effectively transferred to the state bureaucracy or executive. Second, it is doubtful whether political parties effectively operate as centres for political participation in the face of growing evidence that members are becoming increasingly marginalised in the development of party policy. Third, the model assumes that informed voters elect parties on the basis of their policy differences, and that these differences are sufficiently distinct for a genuine choice to be made. As we have seen, parties are converging in their policy positions as less emphasis is placed on ideological difference and partisan attachment, and more on seeking the median mandate. Further, the impact of policy voting remains weak in relation to other factors such as party performance and leadership image (Judge 1999: 73; King 1997; Sanders 1997).
Evidence of the growing power of the parliamentary party at the expense of the membership and extra-party organisation have important ramifications for both the participatory and representative aspects of party functions. Policy is now originating from the parliamentary party, utilising its superior resources, rather than filtering up from the grassroots. Concurrently, accountability mechanisms between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary organisation have weakened, leaving parliamentarians free to implement policy of their choosing, rather than being subject to the mandate of the party conference. This has led to the criticism that successive governments simply fail to implement their election policies and manifestos. This trend was noted by Birch (1971: 100) in British politics in the early 1970s and confirmed again by Klingemann et al. in the 1990s: ‘in spite of institutional arrangements that should allow for a strong mandate in British policymaking, there is considerable evidence of a politics of accommodation’ (1994: 79).
There are inevitably some areas of policy where it is unrealistic for parties in government to consult their membership, for example, responses to terrorism and national security. Political parties, whether in government or in opposition, must also respond quickly to topical debates in the legislature and due to the slow and cumbersome nature of internally democratic policy-making, which can often take a number of years, official policy processes are often side-stepped by the parliamentary party. Furthermore, there are few official channels of accountability between the extra-parliamentary party and its MPs, who are constitutionally regarded as independent legislators in many liberal democracies. A survey of Westminster MPs conducted by Burnell (1980: 14) found that most parliamentarians, regardless of their party orientation, share a common conception of their roles as ‘independent’ legislators: ‘they see themselves as representatives very much as defined by Burke’ and ‘claim the right to exercise their individual judgement, and on that basis to treat the party’s Election Manifesto and Programme as little more than advisory’.
Regardless of MPs’ perceptions of their legislative roles, other research has confirmed the dominance of party over Parliament. In contrast to the Burkean ideal of representation, Labour parliamentarians are expected to vote under the guidance of the party whip. The discipline expected of MPs was made perfectly clear by Tony Blair in the first meeting of his Parliamentary Labour Party: ‘by all means, speak your mind but remember what you were sent here to do’ (quoted in Cowley et. al. 2001: 92). Whilst voting with the party line is prima facie compatible with the representative model of party government, much rests on the extent to which that policy is reflective of the views of the party’s members, voters and supporters. As the previously cited empirical studies have suggested, party policy is being increasingly determined by the leadership and this influences the voting behaviour of MPs. A survey of newly elected Westminster MPs conducted by the Study of Parliament group in 1992 found that the ‘party leadership’ heavily influenced legislative decision-making (cited in Judge 1999: 64-5). ‘Of 79 respondents (61.4 per cent of all 127 new Members) well over four-fifths maintained that their voting decisions and parliamentary actions would ‘usually’ or ‘nearly always’ be ‘strongly influenced’ by their party leadership’ (Judge 1999: 64). However, this does not necessarily mean that party policy is representative of the party’s grassroots, as assumed in the party representation model. For example, a YouGov poll of Labour members during the 2006 education debate revealed that rebel MPs positions on the legislation were actually closer to the views of the membership than the Labour frontbench (UK Polling Report 13 March 2006).
Labour MP and former Chairman of the party’s National Policy Forum, Peter Hain, has suggested that ‘current government policy-making is poorly integrated with the party’s own deliberations’ (2004: 26). Indeed, since New Labour came to power there have been several instances where the government has proposed policy not previously approved by the membership. The debate surrounding foundation hospitals, Labour’s health policy during 2002 and tuition fees provide excellent examples (see Campbell and Zeichner 2001). As Hain (2004: 25) notes, ‘the fact that the policy had not received prior endorsement from the party exacerbated the resulting controversy. Only belatedly was the policy explained with reference to core Labour values…following widespread disquiet among the membership’.
However, it is important to note that all of these criticisms are not entirely new. Despite its influence on the development of party theory, it is doubtful whether there ever was a ‘golden age’ of mass parties and membership participation. Indeed, party scholars such as Wilson (1962: 347), Duverger (1963), Schumpeter (1942) and as early as Michels (1915) [1962] argued that whilst membership participation and internally democratic party procedures were not necessarily undesirable, they were impossible to pragmatically achieve in the competition for votes. If parties choose to prioritise their electoral campaigns and maximise their votes, the efficiency and degree of cohesion with which the party can recruit political elites and contest government is paramount. The quick release of coherent policies and the selection and training of candidates who bring electoral success requires a hierarchical party organisation to maintain the unity of the party position so electors may have a clear choice between parties (Schumpeter 1942)[ii]. As Duverger (see Saglie & Heidar 2004: 386) argues,
A party may well be internally democratic, but ‘organized in this fashion, a party is not well armed for the struggles of politics’. If one party in a party system ‘organize[s] itself along authoritarian and autocratic lines, the others would be placed in a position of inferiority’.
Regardless of whether such hierarchies are desirable, their formation may be inevitable. In his famous pronouncement of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’, Michels (1962) argued that participatory democracy within political parties is unsustainable: the division of labour required within a party produces an elite with superior political knowledge, skills and autonomous interests, which inevitably governs the party.
From this analysis, it is clear that the reality of party government and representation does not reflect the theory, and there is some doubt as to whether it ever really did. This is not to say that theory does not matter. Rather, it still plays a crucial role in the way parties present themselves to the electorate, creating a very interesting paradox. Despite the fact that parties struggle to fulfill their linkage function according to the model of party government outlined at the beginning of this paper, many (if not most) parties still claim to be organised in a manner consistent with the representative model of the mass party, in that they provide a voice to their membership and the opportunity to influence policy.
This continues to be the case within the social democratic parties that originated from this era (see for example UK Labour’s Partnership in Power 2006). It is also a basic feature of the organisation of green parties and liberal democratic parties that provide their members with formal opportunities to influence party policy, and to differing degrees, demand party discipline and adherence to policy from their elected representatives. For example, New Labour claims that ‘all members, local parties, affiliates as well as other party stakeholders have the right to a direct say in the party’s policy development’ (Labour Party 2007). Similarly, the preamble to the Liberal Democrats’ Constitution emphasises the party’s commitment to the representative and participatory function of parties in facilitating democracy: ‘we believe that people should be involved in running their communities. We are determined to strengthen the democratic process’ (Liberal Democrats 2006). Even the Conservative Party under the leadership of David Cameron has been pushed toward greater inclusiveness, participation and community involvement in party policy processes (The Guardian 11 June 2007, p. 10).
It is difficult to tell whether parties’ rhetoric is reflective of community expectations, or is continuing to perpetuate false expectations, or whether this is a symbiotic process. A significant amount of academic attention, particularly in the work of Susan Scarrow (1996), has been devoted to establishing a link between internally democratic structures that encourage participation and deliberation, and the legitimacy of political parties. The notion of legitimacy derives from the logical assumption that the internal organisation of political parties should mirror the democratic organisation of the state (Blondel 1978: 140). Active and robust memberships assist the electoral fortunes of parties, enabling them to present themselves as organisations driven by members, rather than dictated by professional politicians (Scarrow 1996: 42). This demand for legitimate internal processes is, in part, the by-product of a post materialist society. In the last few decades social and political transformations such as increasing levels of education and the provision of information have heightened cognitive mobilisation and awareness (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1990), have ‘significantly altered citizens’ views about how political processes should operate’ and increased their ‘reluctance to merely choose among pre-packaged party platforms and party candidates, and citizens are now more interested in having opportunities to participate in political decision-making processes’ (Kittilson and Scarrow 2003: 59). Participatory democracy within parties is seen as conducive to personal self-development, as individuals ‘learn to participate by participating and that feelings of political efficacy are most likely to be developed in a participatory environment’ (Pateman 1970: 105).
Whether or not parties are striving to meet social expectations, or actually perpetuating false ones, it is clear that the dominant social conception of party government remains that which was developed in response to the political practice of the early 20th century, and it continues to shape political debate. For example, in the current transition of the Labour Party leadership, Gordon Brown has not opened a new discourse reflecting the reality of how parties operate, but rather has called for organisational reforms ‘to meet 21st century challenges that require us to involve and engage ourselves in all our communities and also to consult the membership and make them fully involved in making policy in the future’ (The Guardian 11 June 2007, p. 10). Similarly, the reluctance to re-evaluate normative expectations and democratic norms within party theory has led to somewhat of a stalemate in the party literature, culminating in a crisis of representation.
In the last two centuries, political parties have evolved from organisations that were viewed sceptically and officially excluded from the practice of government, to entities seen as inherent to representative democracy. Given the relatively late development of parties and the fact that the theory of party government has largely responded to political practice rather than having led it, parties have been described as the ‘orphans of political philosophy’ (Schattschneider 1942: 10-12). Empirical studies of parties and the literature on democratic theory have tended to exist in isolation from one another and democratic norms are often taken for granted or viewed as self-evident truths. Whilst parties are an essential part of government today, little conscious consideration has been given to the role that they play, how this has changed over time, and the implications for democratic theory.
Instead, our expectations of political parties in government and within representative democracies more broadly remain rooted in the mass party paradigm. Parties should act as both centres of participation and representation, with policy preferences filtering up through the grassroots to be implemented by the party’s representatives in the legislature. This model assumes a distinct chain of accountability between members, voters, the party organisation and its elected representatives. However, as this paper has documented, there has been a distinct shift in political practice with parties becoming more professional organisations targeting the median voter rather than maintaining a distinct ideological position, whilst the power and input of the membership has been downgraded as the expense of the party leadership, particularly the party’s elected representatives.
These trends have prompted widespread disillusionment and disengagement with parties, from both members and voters, culminating in what has been termed a ‘crisis of representation’. It seems as though parties are not meeting the democratic benchmark expected of them, and that there is a significant disjoint between the theory and practice of democracy. However, rather than revise our expectations of parties’ role and performance in modern democracies, both social expectations and those assumed in the academic literature remain constant. This has created somewhat of a stalemate in both the theory and practice of politics: we face constant calls for the renewal of party organisations, and parties seem intent on reinventing themselves as ‘modern’ participatory and representative institutions. However, as demonstrated, their ability to actually do so is doubtful and hence public disenchantment and disengagement continues to characterise electoral politics into the 21st century.
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[i] In Australia, reference to political parties was inserted into the constitution by referendum in 1977. In New Zealand and the United Kingdom, political parties have been recognised in legislative instruments pertaining to the functioning of representative democracy: the Electoral Act 1986 (NZ) and the Registration of Political Parties Act 1998 (UK).
[ii] However, the requirement of a clear electoral choice may be satisfied if a party possesses a coherent or defining ideology, notwithstanding differences of opinion within the party (Budge 1996: 131-2).
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